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This Article defends class-based admissions practices against the
two criticisms most frequently directed at such policies. The merit
critique contends that admissions policies that take account of
applicants' socioeconomic status undermine the goals and values
of meritocratic admissions. The racial diversity critique asserts
that class-based policies are woefully inadequate to the task of
producing a racially diverse group of admitted students. Each of
these critiques is misguided. Class-based admissions policies
comport with the underlying values of meritocratic admissions as
fully as, if not more so than, policies that do not consider
applicants' socioeconomic status. Class-based policies may also
produce a much more racially diverse group of admitted
applicants than such policies' critics recognize.
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INTRODUCTION
The propriety of admissions policies that take account of
applicants' socioeconomic status has become an important aspect of
the school admissions controversy.1 Numerous schools now consider
applicants' socioeconomic status2 either directly3 or through a proxy
1. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic
Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1913, 1914 (1996) (describing the controversy regarding
class-based admissions approaches and evaluating the various rationales for such
policies). Indeed, class-based policies have drawn notable support. One of the earliest
defenses of class-based admissions is found in Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in
DeFunis v. Odegaard. 416 U.S. 312, 331 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (advocating
consideration in the admissions process of "barriers that [an applicant] had overcome").
Prior to taking the bench, Justice Thomas also voiced support for class-based policies.
Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough
Enough!, 5 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 402, 410-11 (1987) (arguing that preferences should
be on the basis of "obstacles that have been unfairly placed in individuals' paths, rather
than on the basis of race or gender"). For the most comprehensive defense of class-based
policies in education and employment, see RICHARD KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY:
RACE, CLASS, AND AFFIRMATIVE AcrION passim (1996).
2. In this Article, I use the terms "socioeconomic status" and "class"
interchangeably.
3. See Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 472, 472 (1997) (describing the class-based admissions program
implemented at the UCLA law school); Michael W. Kirst, New Criteria for College
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such as geographic location.4  Other class-based admissions
approaches have been recently proposed.5 Both scholarly and
popular debate have proliferated.6
Class-based admissions policies, although increasingly popular,
have been subject to two criticisms: the merit critique and the racial
diversity critique.7 The merit critique faults class-based policies as
deviations from merit-based criteria that inevitably undermines the
meritocratic principles that college admissions should embody." The
Admissions, EDUC. WK., Apr. 21, 1999, at 48, http:lwww.edweek.orglewl
ew printstory.cfm?slug=32kirst.h18 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (noting
that a number of University of California campuses consider class-related characteristics
such as whether an applicant is a first generation college student).
4. The public university systems in Texas and California have adopted percentage
plans under which applicants in the top ten percent and four percent, respectively, of their
high school class are automatically admitted. See J. Phillip Thompson & Sarah Tobias,
The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1121, 1121 (2000) (arguing that
although no evidence suggests that the Texas "ten percent" plan will be as successful as
affirmative action, it could potentially increase the proportion of minority and low-
income students admitted to Texas public universities); Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer,
Note, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 245, 245 (1998)
(describing the Texas "ten percent" plan and characterizing it as ineffective); Jeffrey
Selingo, What States Aren't Saying About the "X-Percent Solution," CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., June 2, 2000, at A31 (criticizing geographic percentage admissions plans in
California, Florida, and Texas); Kenneth R. Weiss, UC Board Expected to OK Davis Plan
to Admit Top 4%, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1999, at Al (describing the California plan); Jodi
Wilgoren, Rights Panel Criticizes Shift in College Admissions Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,
2000, at 14 (describing the United States Commission on Civil Rights's critique of the
plans).
5. For example, the Educational Testing Service considered designating as
"strivers" those students who scored substantially above the average for the reference
group. E.g., Linda Chavez, "Striving" for Relevant SATs, DENVER POST, Sept. 12, 1999,
at K2; Ben Gose, More Points for "Strivers": The New Affirmative Action?, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 17, 1999, at A55; Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Colleges, the Poor,
and the SAT's, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1999, at A19; Amy D. Marcus, New Weights Can
Alter SAT Scores: Family is Factor in Determining Who's a "Striver," WALL ST. J., Aug.
31, 1999, at Bi; Clarence Page, More Factors Come to Fore in Test Scores, ARIz.
REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1999, at B7. For another class-based affirmative action proposal, see
KAHLENBERG, supra note 1, at 156-57.
6. E.g., Holley & Spencer, supra note 4, at 277-78; Selingo, supra note 4; Wilgoren,
supra note 4.
7. The increasing popularity of class-based policies is remarkable given that class
distinctions have historically garnered little scholarly attention, nor produced class-
oriented social movements or policy. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class
Conundrum and the Pursuit of Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 1353, 1366-68 (1995) (noting the lack of class consciousness in American society and
the historical paucity of class-based movements or social policy).
8. See, e.g., Tung Yin, A Carbolic Smoke Ball for the Nineties: Class-Based
Affirmative Action, 31 LOY. L.A. L REV. 213, 215 (1997) (contending that class-based
affirmative action is "actually worse" than race-based affirmative action); Christopher
Caldwell, The Meritocracy Dodge, WKLY. STANDARD, July 14, 1997, at 23 (arguing that
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merit critique portrays class-based policies as contrary to meritocratic
principles insofar as they do not admit the highest-achieving
applicants. The racial diversity critique characterizes class-based
policies as unable to admit a racially diverse group of students
because such policies elide the significance of race.9
This Article defends class-based admissions policies against both
of these criticisms.' 0 It demonstrates that class-based admissions
although embraced by some conservatives, class-based affirmative action undermines
merit just as race-based affirmative action does); cf Fallon, supra note 1, at 1928-36
(recognizing the possibility of class-based policies consistent with merit, but concluding
that class-based admissions policies generally sacrifice merit). The view that class-based
admissions policies sacrifice merit is implicit in many arguments against affirmative
action. See, e.g., What the Deserving Deserve and Whether They Get It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 1999, at Bl (reporting the position of Linda Chavez, president of the Center for
Equal Opportunity, that universities should continue to determine merit based upon
measures of intellectual ability and conscientious determination); James Traub, The Class
of Prop. 209, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 78 (arguing that admissions
standards based upon merit are preferable to affirmative action).
9. See, e.g., Jerome Karabel, No Alternative: The Effects of Colorblind Admissions
in California, in CHILLING ADMISSIONS: THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CRISIS AND THE
SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES 33, 37-38 (Gary Orfield & Edward Miller eds., 1988)
[hereinafter CHILLING ADMISSIONS] (arguing that consideration of applicants'
socioeconomic status would produce minimal racial diversity); Deborah C. Malamud,
Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1847, 1898 (1996)
[hereinafter Malamud, Lessons and Caveats] (cautioning that the use of a "simple metric"
in measuring economic status for the purpose of class-based affirmative action would
overestimate the economic status of minorities and women); Linda F. Wightman, The
Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of
Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
40 (1997) (examining the consequences of not using race as a law school admissions
standard); Fredrick A. Morton, Jr., Note, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Another
Illustration of America Denying the Impact of Race, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 1089, 1089-90
(1993) (characterizing class-based admissions policies as suppressing the importance of
race). See generally Russell, supra note 7 (arguing that class-based policy proposals
reflect a notion of individualism that denies the significance of race). Deborah Malamud
has stated that the idea that racial diversity will be significantly increased with class-based
affirmative action is a misconception because, while the poverty rates of minorities are
indeed disproportionately high, the number of poor white individuals surpasses that of
poor black and Latino individuals. Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based
Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452, 465 (1997) [hereinafter Malamud, Assessing
Class-Based Affirmative Action]. Thus, most of the poverty-based affirmative action slots
will go to whites, and minorities admission will not increase dramatically. Slots intended
for them will instead go to white individuals, defeating the attempts to increase racial
diversity through class-based admission programs. Id.
10. The arguments developed in this Article might also apply to secondary school
admissions, about which there has also been considerable controversy. See, e.g., Wessman
v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 791 (1st Cir. 1998) (striking down Boston Latin School's
affirmative action program); Race Quota "Suspect" in Boston, NEWSDAY (New York),
Apr. 8, 1996, at A15, LEXIS, News Library, Newsday File (explaining a federal judge's
order that a white student be admitted to Boston Latin School pending the resolution of
the student's legal challenge to the school's race-based admissions program).
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policies are as consistent with meritocratic values and goals as
policies that do not consider applicants' socioeconomic status and
that such policies may produce a more racially diverse group of
admitted students than typically recognized by critics." Beyond
simply defending existing policies, I recommend that the
consideration of applicants' socioeconomic status be more central to
the admissions processes of elite universities.
Elite universities should consider the socioeconomic status of
every applicant (rather than only those applicants below some
threshold of disadvantage) and should employ a broad (rather than
narrow) measure of class. I describe this form of class-based
admissions as the relative achievement approach. It entails a broad
formulation of socioeconomic status because its purpose is partly to
account for the effect of differential access to achievement-related
resources. Such a broad formulation of socioeconomic status would
also likely substantially enhance the racial diversity of the group of
admitted applicants. The relative achievement approach would
adjust upward the grades and test scores of applicants with less than
maximum access to achievement-related resources.
12
Implementation of the relative achievement approach would create
student bodies less rigidly stratified by socioeconomic status and
absolute achievement level across schools, an outcome that would
further both meritocratic values and racial inclusion.
13
Beyond the college admissions controversy, I seek to undermine
two common tendencies in discussions of racial inequality and merit.
First, I want to dispel the assumption that only policies formally
11. For arguments that class-based programs lead to minimal racial diversity, see
Malamud, Lessons and Caveats, supra note 9, at 1852; Linda F. Wightman, Are Other
Things Essentially Equal? An Empirical Investigation of the Consequences of Including
Race as a Factor in Law School Admission, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 42 (1998); Wightman,
supra note 9, at 40; Fred L. Pincus, Higher Segregation, NATION, Dec. 14, 1998, at 39, 39
(reviewing CHILLING ADMISSIONS: THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CRISIS AND THE
SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES (Gary Orfield & Edward Miller eds., 1988)).
12. This Article does not attempt to pass judgment on the ability of grades, test
scores, or other traditional measures of achievement to predict future success. Criticism
of standardized tests as measures of intelligence is well known. E.g., STEPHEN JAY
GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 9-29 (1981). My position is that whatever
standardized indicators of achievement admissions officers use (and I believe there must
be some), the indicators should be evaluated in the context of the family and
environmental variables that are known to affect the achievement level of high school
students.
13. In other words, the relative achievement approach introduces no trade-off
between equality and efficiency. For a description of the tension between the policy goals
of equity and efficiency, see generally ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY:
THE BIG TRADE-OFF (1975).
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framed in terms of race can promote racial equality and inclusion.
Race-blind measures may significantly further racial equality goals.
The relative achievement approach furthers racial inclusion without
formal consideration of race and does so in a manner that may mute
the stereotypes and stigma that depress the academic performance of
some racial minority students. 4 Second, I counter the vision of merit
as akin to a "thing" residing in people. Merit is a functional
concept-no quality or characteristic is inherently meritorious. Merit
is necessarily defined with respect to particular contexts, goals, and
values.
Part I of this Article disentangles the two substantive rationales
of meritocracy-one efficiency-oriented, the other individualist.15
Part II examines more closely the individualist rationale. Part III
then considers whether the absolute or relative achievement standard
better promotes the meritocratic goal of productive efficiency.
Finally, Part IV sketches the components of a broad formulation of
socioeconomic status and explains why it could produce a more
racially diverse group of admitted students than commonly thought.
I. DISAGGREGATING MERIT
There are three rationales for meritocratic college admissions-
two substantive and one procedural. 6 The common intuition is that
each of these rationales is best furthered by admitting the highest-
achieving applicants-a perspective I describe as the absolute
achievement approach. The admissions process of nearly every
14. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCH. 797,797 (1995); Jeff Howard
& Ray Hammond, Rumors of Inferiority, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 1985, at 17, 17; Claude
M. Steele, Race and the Schooling of Black Americans, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1992,
at 68, 68.
15. See, e.g., Amartya Sen, Merit and Justice, in MERITOCRACY AND ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY 5, 8 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 2000) (describing two different conceptions
of merit: one concerned with outcomes and instructional usefulness, the other with the
character of actions irrespective of instrumental considerations); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
To Each According to His Ability, From None According to His Race: The Concept of
Merit in the Law of Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U. L. REv. 815, 823-25 (1980) (noting both
backward-looking and forward-looking conceptions of merit).
16. Of course, some plausible admissions schemes are wholly ameritocractic, for
example, admissions by lottery. For a discussion of this alternative, see JAMES S.
FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE FAMILY 110-13 (1983); Fallon, supra
note 15, at 864-77; Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action:
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953, 1008-29 (1996).
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selective college and university embodies the absolute achievement
approach.
17
In this Part, I briefly address the procedural rationale and then
distinguish the substantive rationales so that they may be more fully
examined in Parts II and III. Although the absolute achievement
criterion no more furthers these three distinct rationales for
meritocracy than does the relative achievement approach, the merit
critique reinforces the view that class-based policies, as an adjunct to
the normal admissions process, violate meritocratic principles.'8
A. Procedural Virtue
The procedural virtue of merit stems from the impersonal and
objective nature of meritocratic criteria. To the extent that merit
criteria are objective, they are less prone to arbitrariness or
intentional misuse than subjective standards that vest significant
discretion in the official applying the standard. 9 The impersonal
nature of merit criteria generally prohibits selection on the basis of
ascription.20  These procedural virtues are perhaps especially
meaningful in the context of college admissions where for many
generations applicants were excluded based on their ascriptive
17. For example, in the early 1990s, the University of Texas Law School based its
admissions decision in part upon the so-called "Texas Index" number, a composite of an
applicant's undergraduate GPA and LSAT score. The Texas system was challenged
because it applied different ranges of acceptable index numbers to applicants of different
races. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 936 (5th Cir. 1996). At the time of Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the University of California at
Davis admitted students to its medical school based on ratings assigned to undergraduate
GPA, an interview, MCAT scores, and other criteria combined in a "benchmark" score.
Id. at 273-74. During the same period, the University of Washington combined college
grades and LSAT scores into a "Predicted First Year Average." DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312, 321 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Michael A. Olivas, Higher
Education Admissions and the Search for One Important Thing, 21 U. ARK. LirLE ROCK
L. REV. 993, 995 (1999) (observing that graduate and professional school "admissions
committees overwhelmingly rely upon previous cumulative GPAs and standardized test
scores to make their admissions decisions").
18. See, e.g., Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN.
L. REv. 855, 856 (1995) (describing affirmative action as a deviation from the normal
procedures of selection); Caldwell, supra note 8, at 23 (stating that class-based affirmative
action undermines merit); Fallon, supra note 1, at 1916 (noting that affirmative action,
whether based on race or socioeconomic status, "is generally viewed as a supplement to
or modification of ... an institution's 'normal' scheme for distributing competitively
sought after opportunities, such as education or jobs").
19. Fallon, supra note 15, at 838-39 (noting that the objective nature of meritocratic
criteria tends to preclude individual acts of illicit discrimination).
20. Id. at 837 (observing that "merit distribution has been considered ... a diametric
alternative to selection on the basis of race").
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identity21 and where selective colleges need some means of quickly
and reliably sorting thousands of applicants.2
I do not examine this procedural or formal virtue at length
because it provides little basis for choosing between the absolute and
relative achievement approaches. Both can be reduced to objective
formulas that minimize arbitrariness and subjectivity.' Both can
readily sort along a single metric the variety of applicants that
selective colleges must evaluate,24 and neither formally relies on
ascriptive categories such as race or gender.
B. Substantive Values
Merit-based school admissions might be justified on either or
both of two substantive values, individual desert15 and productive
efficiency. Both are fundamental to American culture and society.26
Meritocracy is individualist insofar as it seeks to distribute
opportunities and resources on the basis of the conduct or attributes
of individuals. It is productivity-oriented to the extent that it
distributes opportunities and resources based on predictions of future
performance that will enhance societal well-being.27  Thus,
21. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF
THE MERITOCRACY (1999) (recounting the rise of standardized testing for college
admission in the mid-twentieth century and describing the then-prevailing view that such
testing was fairer than earlier, more ascriptive standards); Jacques Steinberg, For
Gatekeepers at Colleges, a Daunting Task of Sorting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2000, at 1
(noting that for the class of 2004, Wesleyan University had 6849 applications and only 715
available admissions spots).
22. For example, in 1999 Stanford University received 18,888 applications for
undergraduate admission; Harvard received 16,818; and Yale received 11,947. THE
COLLEGE BOARD, THE COLLEGE HANDBOOK 124,171,449 (2000).
23. See Sander, supra note 3, at 481-87 (discussing the implementation of the
admissions index used in the class-based admissions program at the UCLA law school).
24. The class-based admissions policy implemented at the UCLA law school, for
example, generates an index for each applicant that incorporates achievement measures,
as well as socioeconomic status measures. For a description of that program, see
generally id.
25. Throughout this Article, I use a variety of terms to refer to the individualist
rationale: desert, deservingness, and reward.
26. DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 257 (1976)
(observing that in classical liberal thought, the individual is the primary unit of society);
Paul Brest, In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 49
(1976) ("If a society can be said to have an underlying political theory, ours has not been
a theory of organic groups but of liberalism, focusing on the rights of individuals.").
27. See, e.g., Norman Daniels, Merit and Meritocracy, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 206, 207
(1978) ("Claims of merit ... are derived from considerations of efficiency or
productivity."); Fallon, supra note 15, at 838-39 (justifying merit-based distribution
through reference to the norm of productive efficiency and explaining that productive
efficiency is an important value associated with distributional merit); Sen, supra note 15,
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meritocracy both affirms the primacy of the individual and promotes
social productivity. In affirming the primacy of the individual, merit
gives individuals what they deserve;' in promoting efficiency, merit
gives society what it needs z9
C. Merit in College Admissions
The notion that college admissions should be meritocratic is
widely endorsed,3° even by many opponents of conventional
meritocratic standards who refrain from condemning the principle
at 9 (observing that "the economic justification of rewarding merit tends to be grounded
in consequences").
28. The relation between moral desert, equality of opportunity, and merit is subject
to debate, as different analysts formulate the relation differently. Merit, equated with
actual performance, could be viewed as one formulation of equal opportunity. That is,
merit-based distribution by itself would satisfy the demands of equality of opportunity.
See, e.g., FISHKIN, supra note 16, at 22-30; David A. Strauss, The Illusory Distinction
Between Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Result, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 171,
173-74 (1992). Alternatively, equal opportunity might be viewed as a precondition to the
fairness of meritocratic allocation of opportunity. Similarly, desert might be viewed as
distinct from merit, rather than a component of it. See, e.g., Louis P. Pojman, Introduction
to WHAT Do WE DESERVE? 1, 6-7 (Louis P. Pojman & Owen McLeod eds., 1999)
(distinguishing merit and desert as distinct concepts). Merit could be a basis for desert or
desert could be a form of merit. In my framework, different conceptions of equal
opportunity and desert represent different formulations of individual reward.
29. See Sen, supra note 15, at 5 (describing "the concept of 'merit' ... [as] deeply
contingent on our views of a good society"). Criticisms of merit abound. See, e.g.,
PATRICIA A. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 99 (1991) (describing
meritocratic standards as "concrete monuments to socially accepted subjective
preference"); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action,
83 GEO. L.J. 1711, 1715-47 (1995) (describing merit-based decisions as one form of
racism); cf. Fallon, supra note 1, at 1939-44 (describing the background justification for
meritocratic distribution of opportunities as "broadly utilitarian," but also noting that
fairness considerations are relevant to the evaluation of admissions policies).
30. See DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 409 (1973)
("The post-industrial society, in its initial logic, is a meritocracy."); MICKEY KAUS, THE
END OF EQUALITY 40 (1992) (describing college admissions as "a crucial meritocratic
moment"); ROBERT KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELITES 81 (1985) ("[A]mong all the
allocative mechanisms found in society, selection policies for universities ... are perhaps
the most extreme example of allocation on the basis of 'worthiness.' "). See generally
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997) (defending meritocratic evaluation both
in principle and as a practice).
Not everyone endorses the idea of merit, however. See, e.g., DAVID OWEN,
NONE OF THE ABOVE: BEHIND THE MYTH OF SCHOLASTIC APTITUDE 198-99 (1985)
(concluding that merit is usually little more than a camouflage for class and that
meritocracy is eugenics by other means); WILLIAMS, supra note 29, at 103 (describing
standards as "nothing more than structured preferences"); IRIS MARION YOUNG,
JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 202 (1990) (stating that objective and
unbiased merit criteria are impossible to formulate).
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itself and choose instead to criticize its application.31 Merit-based
criteria pervade actual admission practices." Although rarely
constituting the entire admission process, merit-based criteria-
typically standardized test scores and grades (and sometimes class
rank as well)--determine the initial sorting and ranking of applicants
at nearly all selective universities.3
Merit-based distribution of educational opportunities embodies
both values of meritocracy. The individualist rationale treats
admissions slots as rewards for prior performance. The productive
efficiency approach, in contrast, distributes admissions slots on the
basis of expected future performance. 4 Individual desert affirms the
primacy and moral status of the individual,35 treating the individual as
an end. Productivity conceptually subordinates the claims of the
individual to the needs of society, treating the individual as a means
to the end of societal productivity.36
The individualist reward and productive efficiency rationales for
merit-based admissions might be embraced in varying degrees by
31. See, e.g., GERTRUDE EZORSKY, RACISM AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 92 (1991) (observing that in practice "merit selection is not.., the
currently accepted rule" for filling jobs); YOUNG, supra note 30, at 202-13 (rejecting
meritocratic selection because its ideal of impartiality can never be attained); Ira Glasser,
Affirmative Action and the Legacy of Racial Injustice, in ELIMINATING RACISM 341, 350
(Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988) (noting that "factors extrinsic to merit
often and routinely determine who gets particular jobs").
32. See supra note 17.
33. There are alternatives to meritocratic admissions. One non-merit-based
alternative would be admissions by lottery. For a discussion of this alternative, see
FISHKIN, supra note 16, at 110-13; Fallon, supra note 15, at 864-77; Sturm & Guinier,
supra note 16, at 1008-29.
34. See, e.g., GEORGE SHER, DESERT 10 (1987) ("[U]tility and desert do seem to face
in opposite temporal directions.... [A]n action's utility is determined by the future
benefits it will bring, while what a person deserves ordinarily depends on his past or
present actions or characteristics."); John Kleinig, The Concept of Desert, in WHAT DO
WE DESERVE?, supra note 28, at 84, 88, (distinguishing between desert and utilitarian
considerations); cf Jeremy Waldron, The Wisdom of the Multitude, 23 POL. THEORY 563,
563-84 (1995) (drawing a similar distinction between conceptions of merit that are
backward-looking and those that are forward-looking).
35. See, e.g., Owen McLeod, Introduction to WHAT Do WE DESERVE?, supra note
28, at 61, 63-65 (explaining that desert is usually linked with moral responsibility).
36. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER:
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS 53-117 (1998) (assessing various outcomes of admissions processes);
KLITGAARD, supra note 30, at 61-71 (discussing the admissions objective of admitting
students based on their likely future success and the social benefits that would likely
result). See generally Sen, supra note 15 (treating meritocracy as instrumentally
promoting productive efficiency).
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different readers.37 Some readers of this Article might be more
inclined toward the individualist reward rationale; others might favor
the productivity approach. I do not offer any view as to the proper
balance of these two values in selective college admissions, but I do
believe that our ideals of selective college admissions reflect both
individualist and efficiency concerns and that these concerns are
distinct.
The productivity rationale relies upon a form of utilitarian
calculus, whereas the reward rationale implicitly invokes rights-based
claims. If the reward rationale were primarily future performance-
oriented, it would be vulnerable to being weighed against other sorts
of consequentialist considerations, including the societal benefits of
racial integration, and would cease to function as a potential trump. 8
It is only a trump to the extent it is understood as rights-based, as
deriving from something other than a utilitarian calculus.
This Article disaggregates these two distinct rationales in order
to better appreciate the implications of each. The attractiveness of
any particular formulation of merit in selective college admissions is
likely to turn in part on how well it embodies our intuitions about
individual desert and furthers productive efficiency. 9
D. Merit and the Absolute Achievement Model
The prevailing intuition is that the absolute achievement
approach better furthers both productivity and individual reward
than would the relative achievement approach. 0 Individuals should
37. Often the individualist and productivity rationales are intertwined. See, e.g.,
What the Deserving Deserve and Whether They Get It, supra note 8 (collecting views of
deservingness that embody individualist and productivity concerns).
38. For analyses balancing future performance against other sorts of future benefits,
see, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal
Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955,961-66 (1974); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust:
A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1331-33 (1986).
39. Conceptually, the two are linked through incentives. As a reward, slots are
granted in recognition of valued autonomous choice. As a matter of social productivity,
slots are granted on the basis of expected future performance. Social efficiency must take
account of incentives, and the possibility of the effectiveness of incentives presupposes a
realm of autonomous choice integral to individual desert. For a discussion of the relation
of incentives and admission policies, see Stephen Coate & Glenn C. Loury, Will
Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 1220,
1220-39 (1993).
40. The idea is that current achievement serves as a proxy for likely future
performance. Thus, the highest current achievers will be the best future performers. See,
e.g., Fallon, supra note 15, at 823-24 ("Prior achievements are often considered a reliable
index to present ability; persons who succeed in one position may be thought to 'have
what it takes' to succeed in others."). Intuition regarding college admissions is one
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be rewarded on the basis of their achievements, the thinking goes,
and their achievements presage their future performance. According
to this logic, the admission of those students evidencing the highest
level of early academic achievement will both properly reward
individuals and promote productive efficiency.
41
The reflexive equation of merit in college admissions with the
highest level of absolute achievement bypasses fundamental inquiries
with respect to both individual deservingness and productive
efficiency. The need for these inquiries may be obscured by the
tendency to treat merit as a unitary entity that resides within people,
rather than as a means of furthering distinct values and goals.
The intuition that the absolute achievement criterion is
justifiable because it best rewards individuals assumes, perhaps
wrongly, that an individual can be deserving in the deep sense
necessary to justify a social arrangement. That one may be said to be
deserving of admission to a selective college does not necessarily
mean that one is deserving in the sense necessary to justify particular
admissions criteria.42 Putting aside this fundamental question, it is
unclear whether the relative or absolute achievement model better
comports with notions of deservingness.
The equating of the absolute achievement standard with
productive efficiency similarly rests on unexamined normative and
empirical assumptions. Defining productive efficiency with respect
to selective college admissions requires the resolution of two
normative questions. The first, and most fundamental, concerns the
level of analysis. Does productive efficiency entail maximization of
the performance outcomes of the student population of an individual
school or maximization of the performance outcomes produced by
selective college admissions as a system?4' The second concerns the
type of performance outcomes with respect to which admissions
policies should be evaluated. Should one consider primarily in-
school performance or post-schooling professional performance?
expression of a more general view concerning the inferences that may be drawn from high
achievement.
41. The adoption of a relative achievement standard, in contrast, would presumably
undermine productive efficiency and fail to reward the most deserving applicants.
42. See infra Part II.
43. The analysis of this issue draws heavily from Norman Daniels, B. Alden
Thresher, and Michael McPherson and Morton Shapiro. See generally S. MICHAEL
MCPHERSON & MORTON OWEN SHAPIRO, SELECTIVE ADMISSION AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (1990) (applying the macro-productivity principle to school admissions); B.
ALDEN THRESHER, COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1966) (same);
Daniels, supra note 27 (applying the macro-productivity principle to hiring practices).
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Although essential to evaluating the productive efficiency of school
admissions, these questions, especially the first, are rarely squarely
addressed. Because these normative questions are not addressed, the
appropriate empirical inquiries are even less frequently identified.
In sum, admitting the highest-achieving students does not further
individual desert and productive efficiency with as much certainty as
the primacy of the absolute achievement approach would suggest."
Individual desert raises difficult questions concerning the possibility
and nature of deservingness and the requirements of fairness and
equal opportunity.45 The goal of productivity highlights complex
issues of prediction and measurement and, most fundamentally, the
normative question of the definition of "efficiency" in selective
college admissions.46
II. MERIT-AS-REWARD
In this Part, I demonstrate that the individual desert rationale
for meritocratic admissions does not compel the absolute
achievement approach. A relative achievement approach that
corrects for environment, but not for ability, comports with notions
of reward as well as, if not better than, the absolute achievement
approach.
There are at least two problems with the claim that recognizing
individual desert compels the absolute achievement criterion. The
first problem is that there is no account of deservingness sufficient to
compel any particular admissions criteria. Putting aside this
fundamental question of whether deservingness may justify any
admissions policy, deciding that admissions slots are to be allocated
on the basis of deservingness says little about whether deservingness
is better captured by a relative or absolute achievement criterion.47
A. Modes of Deservingness
The widespread intuition that the highest-achieving applicants to
an elite college deserve to be admitted over less high-achieving
applicants might rely upon one of three distinct conceptions of
deservingness: 4" the institutional practices conception,49 the
44. See infra Parts II, III.
45. See infra Part II.
46. See infra Part III.
47. For some of the most useful works on desert, see JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY passim (1970); SHER, supra
note 34, passim; WHAT DO WE DESERVE?, supra note 28, passim.
48. I do not intend this discussion as a comprehensive account of the ways in which
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performance-contribution rationale,50 or the choice-responsibility
approach.5 ' Only under the choice-responsibility approach may
deservingness even theoretically provide the basis for formulating an
admissions policy, but that conception of deservingness is no better
furthered by an absolute rather than relative achievement approach.
1. Institutional Practices
The institutional practices conception of deservingness focuses
on the legitimate expectations engendered by prevailing institutional
policy and practice. Individuals expect to be treated consistent with
prevailing practices. Failure to confer such treatment violates
reasonable expectations. In the admissions context, if a selective
university has established the practice of evaluating applicants on the
basis of their absolute level of academic achievement, then applicants
deserve to be evaluated on that basis, and the highest-achieving
applicants deserve to be admitted before lower achieving applicants.
The highest-achieving applicants have fulfilled the admissions
requirements as formulated by the elite university to a greater extent
than have less high-achieving applicants. The highest-achieving
applicants should be admitted because the existing rules dictate their
selection.
53
The problem with the institutional practices approach is that
while practices may engender expectations, those expectations
one might be deserving. Rather, the three conceptions that I discuss seem to be the most
plausible and useful formulations of desert in selective college admissions. Philosophers
have generated numerous systems for cataloguing desert. E.g., FEINBERG, supra note 47,
at 62 (identifying five categories of deserved treatment: "(1) awards of prizes, (2)
assignments of grades, (3) rewards and punishments, (4) praise and blame, and (5)
reparation, liability, and other modes of compensation"); Bruce N. Waller, Just and
Nonjust Deserts, 25 S. J. PHIL. 229, 229-31 (1987) (distinguishing between four senses of
desert: act-deserving, talent-deserving, effort-deserving, and justice-deserving).
49. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTICE 311 (1971) (noting that "as persons
and groups take part in just arrangements, they acquire claims on one another defined by
the publicly recognized rules").
50. SHER, supra note 34, at 121 (positing that "selecting by merit is a way of taking
seriously the potential agency of both the successful and unsuccessful applicants").
51. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 311-12 (linking moral deservingness to responsibility
for the traits on the basis of which one might be deserving).
52. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 47, at 85-87 (discussing institutional desert, as
opposed to pre-institutional desert); RAWLS, supra note 49, at 103-04 (same); SLIER,
supra note 34, at 119 (discussing the institutional conception of desert); Kleinig, supra
note 34, at 88-89 (distinguishing between raw desert and institutional desert and
describing the latter as entitlement and not desert); id. at 88 ("Desert... is not created by
satisfying the conditions laid down in a system of... rules .....
53. RAWLS, supra note 49, at 311.
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cannot then be offered to justify the indefinite continuation of those
practices. 4  This form of deservingness derives from existing
institutional policies; it does not justify them. The highest-achieving
student might deserve to be admitted over a less high-achieving
student because established practice dictates that she should be, but
the highest-achieving student would not deserve to have had the
institution enact a policy of admission based largely on past
achievement.
The institutional practices approach limits the range of
admissions criteria given a particular set of institutional practices and
policies. This approach is of undeniably limited usefulness when it is
those very policies that are at issue.55 Another sort of argument is
needed to justify those institutional policies in the first instance.
2. Performance-Contribution Approach
The performance-contribution account of deservingness
represents an attempt at one such argument. This approach ties
one's deservingness to the contribution to social productivity
represented by one's performance 6.5  Deservingness corresponds to,
and arises from, one's contribution. In this view, those who will
perform the best in the future are the most deserving of the benefit of
selective college admission now. 57
The problem with this view of deservingness is that it ultimately
collapses into one of the alternative justifications for an admissions
scheme .5  To say that performance or contribution grounds desert,
one must say why desert derives from performance. Answering that
question almost inevitably leads back to either the institutional
practices or choice-responsibility conceptions of deservingness or to
the consequentialist analysis more typical of the productive efficiency
approach. An account of individual deservingness that, at bottom,
reflects a productive efficiency argument or a claim about the
expectations engendered by prevailing institutional practices is
insufficient to justify the absolute achievement approach.
54. See id.
55. See FEINBERG, supra note 47, at 85-87; RAWLS, supra note 49, at 103-04.
56. See SHER, supra note 34, at 121; cf David Miller, Distributive Justice: What
People Think, 102 ETHics 555, 562-63 (1992) (describing lay views of desert as deriving
from contribution or performance).
57. See SHER, supra note 34, at 121.
58. See id. at 122.
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3. Choice-Responsibility Conception
An account of deservingness sufficient to compel the absolute
achievement approach must rely upon the notion of individual moral
desert.5 9 The notion of individual moral desert embodies the view
that one should be rewarded on the basis of attributes or
characteristics for which one is responsible. Moral desert affirms the
moral salience of responsibility and autonomous choice.60 One may
feel pride and elicit praise on the basis of one's choices for which one
bears moral responsibility, but not on the basis of characteristics over
which the individual has no control and for which the individual
therefore should not be held morally accountable. 61 The claim that
some opportunities should be distributed on the basis of moral desert
has attracted some measure of support in philosophical circles.62
The adoption of moral desert as a basis for the distribution of
admissions slots raises a number of difficult issues, however. The
goal of desert-based distribution of admissions slots is to recognize
those relevant individual attributes or achievements reflective of
one's autonomous will and agency.63 But how might one separate the
chosen from the unchosen? One chooses neither one's environment,
nor one's ability.' Indeed, all apparently chosen actions might be
redescribed as determined by the confluence of unchosen, contingent
59. For the most extended analyses of moral desert, see generally FEINBERG, supra
note 47; SHER, supra note 34; WHAT Do WE DESERVE, supra note 28.
60. One may "deserve" to receive some societal resource or opportunity for any of a
number of reasons. Norms of distribution differ across contexts depending on the
particular resource in question. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 47, at 55-94 (cataloguing
the different meanings of desert and the different types of treatment with respect to
which one may be deserving); Waller, supra note 48, at 229-31 (describing four different
bases on which one might deserve something). One might also be said to deserve
particular treatment on the basis of some characteristic of one's self, as distinguished from
one's past conduct. See FEINBERG, supra note 47, at 58-61.
61. Not all philosophers agree with this claim. Some would contend that in order to
deserve particular treatment one need not deserve, in any deep sense, all of the aspects of
the self that would serve as the basis for that particular deserved treatment. See, e.g.,
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 224-27 (1974).
62. See FEINBERG, supra note 47, at 55-87 (discussing the relation between desert
and justice and concluding that "[d]esert is always an important consideration ... but it is
not the only consideration and is rarely a sufficient one"); SHER, supra note 34, at 17-20
(appealing to intuitions about deservingness to support the claim that desert is an
important and defensible moral concept).
63. See FEINBERG, supra note 47, at 59 (claiming that the only desert bases are
characteristics of the individual); SHER, supra note 34, at 150-62 (arguing that desert
affirms the expression of individual agency).
64. See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 311 (noting that "no one deserves his place in the
distribution of natural assets any more than he deserves his initial starting place in
society").
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factors.' As a coherent philosophical concept, the notion of moral
desert thus founders on the social determinism conundrum.66
In part for these reasons, moral desert has been largely rejected
as a criterion of justice by most philosophers.67 These philosophers
generally conclude that no one can be deserving in the deep sense
necessary to justify particular institutional arrangements. 68
B. Deservingness as Fairness
The question of deservingness might be better framed not in
terms of choice and responsibility, but in terms of fairness.69 A
decision to give individuals "what they deserve" entails either an
explicit or implicit determination of what is fair.70
The fairness question is most commonly addressed through the
familiar concept of equality of opportunity.71 Notwithstanding almost
universal support for the concept, its meaning remains contested.72 Is
65. See id. at 312.
66. Not all scholars support the demise of desert. See, e.g., Pojman, supra note 28, at
6 ("[T]he idea of justice as desert, a thesis held for centuries as constitutive of sound moral
and political theory, is in our day rejected out of hand by the dominant political
philosophy. Desert ... now suffers as a pariah in an age cynical about individual
responsibility.").
67. Desert is disfavored for other reasons as well. For one, the concept seems to
assume that certain qualities are inherently virtuous or not. For another, a complex,
interdependent social and economic system could hardly base distributive decisions on
some abstract analysis of "what people deserve."
68. See RAWLS, supra note 49, at 104 (arguing that no one deserves the advantages
that his character, abilities, or environment make possible because no one is responsible
for his character, abilities, or the environment into which he is born); id. at 313 ("For a
society to organize itself with the aim of rewarding moral desert as a first principle would
be like having the institution of property in order to punish thieves."); Galen Strawson,
The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility, in WHAT Do WE DESERVE, supra note 28, at
114, 115-16 (arguing against the possibility of moral responsibility for the self).
69. Notwithstanding its philosophical rejection, the concept of desert as fairness
undeniably resonates with the lay public. See Miller, supra note 56, at 559-63
(demonstrating that desert is central to how most people think about justice); id. at 590
(concluding that "popular opinion gives a central place to desert in thinking about justice,
and this presents a marked contrast to most recent theoretical work on that topic").
70. See generally Julian Lamont, The Concept of Desert in Distributive Justice, in
WHAT Do WE DESERVE?, supra note 28, at 101, 101-04 (claiming that desert constitutes
a non-utilitarian criterion of justice); Samuel Scheffier, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes,
and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299, 299-33 (1992)
(arguing that desert plays an important role in people's attitudes toward particular public
policies).
71. See, e.g., FISHKIN supra note 16, at 44-105 (discussing the importance of equality
of opportunity); RICHARD TAWNEY, EQUALITY 100-01 (1964) (same).
72. One of the most concise and insightful discussions of the various potential
meanings of equal educational opportunity can be found in Christopher Jencks, Whom
Must We Treat Equally for Educational Opportunity to be Equal?, 98 ETHICS 518, 519-33
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the ideal of equality of opportunity satisfied by a competition
formally open to all? Or does the notion entail some adjustment for
environmental disparities in resources and opportunities for which
the individual is not responsible, but which may influence subsequent
individual performance? If environmental disparities are to be
corrected for insofar as they are unchosen, then why not compensate
for equally unchosen differences in ability? These are difficult
questions to which the relative and absolute achievement approaches
represent alternative responses.
The absolute achievement approach conceives of equal
opportunity as a race open to all and grants the prize of admission on
the basis of performance, without formal reference to background or
status characteristics. 73  The relative achievement approach, in
contrast,74 suggests that the ideal of equal opportunity might entail
taking account of resource disparities that influence performance and
that reflect no fault or virtue of the individual.75 American society
permits gross disparities among groups in the opportunities and
resources that promote achievement. Rewards go to those who have
achieved, but in the open-race model, achievement is undeniably
linked to the very accidents of birth thought to be displaced by the
implementation of equal opportunity.76
(1988). For other extremely useful treatments of the meaning of equal opportunity, see
generally FISHKIN, supra note 16; DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES (1981); JOHN E.
ROEMER, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY (1998).
73. Christopher Jencks describes this version of equal opportunity as utilitarian. See
Jencks, supra note 72, at 528-31.
74. Debates about college admissions reflect both the vision of a race open to all and
the compensatory view. Recent criticism of race-based affirmative action, for example,
can be read as a plea for a race whose outcome is not formally rigged by ascriptive
characteristics. Calls that genuinely disadvantaged applicants to college should receive
some form of preference in an admissions process encounter little opposition. These
alternative accounts of equal opportunity and desert are not necessarily superior to those
consistent with the absolute achievement approach.
75. Cf Fallon, supra note 1, at 1942 (noting the possibility that inequalities in
opportunity may be redressed through class-based admissions schemes, for example, but
concluding that such inequalities are best addressed through "requiring that everyone
receive the basic prerequisites of physical and intellectual development"). Of course, my
analysis should not be taken to suggest that inequalities in the "prerequisites of physical
and intellectual development" should be deemed acceptable. My claim is simply that as
long as such inequalities in resources persist, compensating for them through approaches
such as class-based admissions is permissible.
76. See, e.g., Herbert Spiegelberg, An Argument for Equality from Compensatory
Desert, in WHAT Do WE DESERVE?, supra note 28, at 109, 152.
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C. The Relative Achievement Conception of Fairness
In the relative achievement model, an admissions criterion is fair
insofar as it equalizes the likelihood of admission of groups with
differential access to achievement-related resources.77 The relative
achievement approach corrects achievement to account for
environmental disparities, but not for ability differences. 78
Either of two rationales might justify correcting for one but not
the other. First, the state might be thought more accountable for
differences in environment than for differences in ability. While
there is dispute about how best to address or remedy environmental
disparities, there is less disagreement as to the basic unfairness of
such disparities. At the same time, few would find fault with an
individual being denied opportunities on the basis of substantially
below average inherited mental ability. Many feel more strongly that
one should not bear the costs of a deficient environment than that
one should not bear the consequences of a deficient intellect.
79
Second, ability seems more integral to the self than does the
environment. 0 One is more fundamentally constituted by one's
genetic inheritance than by one's environment. In this view, whether
one "deserves" one's ability more than one's social environment is
simply irrelevant. The issue is not which arbitrary outcomes one may
take credit for, but the centrality of outcomes to the self."1 In light of
the culturally contingent nature of individual identity, to say that
77. This is a common characterization of the meaning of equality of opportunity. See,
e.g., FISHKIN, supra note 16, at 30-35 (describing the view of equality of opportunity as
the substantive notion of equality of life chance); Spiegelberg, supra note 76, at 155
(concluding that individuals should not be made unequal as a result of the "chance of
birth"); see also Jencks, supra note 72, at 521-25 (discussing various meanings of equal
opportunity); Strauss, supra note 28, at 172-78 (describing equality of opportunity as the
removal of all morally arbitrary influences on achievement).
78. Many philosophers draw no distinction between the moral status of
environmental disparities and ability differences. I am assuming that native ability is
randomly distributed among individuals of different socioeconomic levels. If ability were
not evenly distributed across socioeconomic groups, then correcting for socioeconomic
status would, in fact, partly be correcting for ability.
79. Cf Thomas, supra note 1, at 410-11 ("Any preference given should be directly
related to the obstacles that have been unfairly placed in individuals' paths, rather than
on the basis of race or gender, or on other characteristics that are often poor proxies for
true disadvantage.").
80. Cf SHER, supra note 34, at 157-59 (arguing that one may be deserving on the
basis of characteristics that constitute the person, even though the person is not
responsible for possessing those characteristics); Strauss, supra note 28, at 179 (rejecting
the argument that "talents and abilities are different [from environment] because they are
essential, rather than incidental, to the individual").
81. See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 35, at 194.
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ability is more constitutive of the self than environment is not to say
that such is the case for all societies, throughout all time, merely that
it is so in our society, in this time. 2 The answer that the relative
achievement approach offers to the fairness dilemma is not the only
plausible answer, but it is a perfectly reasonable one.
III. MERIT AS PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY
In this Part, I consider whether the relative or absolute
achievement approach better furthers productive efficiency. The
ambiguity and indeterminacy of the ostensibly straightforward goal
of productive efficiency becomes apparent when one attempts to
establish a more precise specification and actual application to
selective college admissions.83 One must confront difficult normative
questions concerning the measure of productive efficiency and
complex empirical questions concerning the link between admissions
policies and productive efficiency. Surprisingly perhaps, the core
normative issue remains largely ignored, and as a result, the
appropriate empirical inquiries are rarely framed. My argument, in
short, is that productive efficiency would be enhanced if college
student bodies were less stratified by students' socioeconomic status
and absolute level of academic achievement.84 There is some support
for the relative achievement approach, and little justification for the
absolute achievement criterion.
A. The Normative Issue: Maximization of What?
Defining productive efficiency in selective college admissions
requires resolution of two distinct normative questions. The first,
and most fundamental, question concerns the level of analysis.
Should productive efficiency be defined at the level of the individual
82. David Strauss, for example, embraces this criticism. See Strauss, supra note 28, at
179-80 ("Some societies regard race as the central constituent of a person's identity....
Historically, some societies regarded social class as far more central to one's identity than
talents or abilities as we define them. Race is as unalterable as ability, and in some
cultures, social class is no more easily alterable.").
83. See, e.g., Robert M. Hauser et al., Occupational Status, Education & Social
Mobility in the Meritocracy, in MERITOCRACY AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note
15, at 179, 207-09 (discussing a study of high school seniors).
84. Cf. HENRY HANSMANN, HIGHER EDUCATION AS AN ASSOCIATIVE GOOD 8-9
(Yale Law Sch. Program for Studies in Law, Econ. & Pub. Pol'y, Working Paper No. 99-
15, 1999), http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractIid+192576 (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (discussing the "unfortunate consequences" of stratification,
including a reduction in the aggregate effectiveness and average efficiency of higher




school or in terms of the system of selective college admissions?85 I
term school-level analysis micro-productivity, and system-level
analysis macro-productivity. 86  The second normative question
concerns the performance outcomes with respect to which
meritocratic admissions should be evaluated. Does productivity refer
to scholastic performance or to post-schooling professional
performance?
1. Micro- or Macro-productivity
Whereas micro-productivity focuses on the likely future
performance of applicants admitted to a particular school, macro-
productivity considers the optimal allocation of applicants across
institutions of differential status and quality.Y7 Imagine a society with
two universities, one ultra-selective and elite (School A), the other
less selective and less elite (School B). All students who attend
college will attend one or the other of these schools, and all
applicants would prefer to attend School A, which is known as the
better school and whose graduates usually fare better professionally
than those of School B. Applicants not admitted to School A will
attend School B. Applicants differ in terms of both socioeconomic
status and absolute achievement level, and across the applicant pool,
achievement and socioeconomic status are somewhat correlated.88
Let us focus on School A, whose admissions decisions largely
determine the distribution of students between Schools A and B. If
School A seeks to maximize micro-productivity, it will admit those
applicants predicted to perform the best in the future. To maximize
macro-productivity, School A would take account of the fact that the
85. See McPHERSON & SHAPIRO, supra note 43, at 1-3; THRESHER, supra note 43, at
66-76.
86. I borrow these terms from Daniels, supra note 27, at 210-11.
87. MCPHERSON & SHAPIRO, supra note 43, at 1-3; THRESHER, supra note 43, at 66-
76; see also KLITrGAARD, supra note 30, at 121-29 (describing various measures of
professional attainment).
88. There is overwhelming empirical evidence that low socioeconomic status
depresses early academic achievement. See, e.g., Martin E. Orland, Demographics of
Disadvantage: Intensity of Childhood Poverty and Its Relationship to Educational
Achievement, in ACCESS To KNOWLEDGE: AN AGENDA FOR OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS
43, 54-55 (John I. Goodlad & Pamela Keating eds., 1990) (finding various links between
childhood poverty and low educational growth); David J. Armor, Why is Black
Educational Achievement Rising?, 108 PUB. INT. 65, 79-80 (1992) (arguing that rising
black academic achievement results from the improved socioeconomic status of black
families); Karl R. White, The Relation Between Socioeconomic Status and Academic
Achievement, 91 PSYCH. BULL. 461, 461 (1982) (measuring socioeconomic status as a
function of income, education, and/or occupation).
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applicants it declines to admit will likely attend School B. Under the
macro-productivity approach, School A would admit not to maximize
the future performance of its own students or graduates, but to
maximize the aggregate future performance of the student
populations of both schools.
To maximize macro-productivity, School A would thus focus on
the change in individuals' performance attributable to attending
School A rather than School B. The school would admit those
applicants who would gain the most from School A and reject those
applicants who would lose the least from attending School B. s9 This
approach treats the investment of elite college education like other
investments: evaluating it on the basis of its return.'
Micro- and macro-productivity analyses lead to identical
admissions policies only if the highest future achievers also lose the
most by attending School B rather than School A. Alternatively, if
the highest future performers do not reap the greatest gains from
attending School A, then a micro-productivity-oriented policy will
not further macro-productivity. 91
Most analyses of college admissions implicitly adopt the micro-
productivity approach,92  examining scholastic or professional
performance as a function of ability, prior academic preparation, or
socioeconomic background. 93 Rarely are analyses framed in terms of
macro-productivity. The micro-productivity approach predominates
in part because it best reflects schools' own understanding of their
interests and values. As with most institutions, elite colleges are
primarily concerned with their own stability and performance, and
only secondarily concerned with the functioning of the broader
system of which they are a part.
89. Stated differently, to promote macro-productivity, School A would admit those
applicants who would lose the most by attending School B, and reject those applicants
who would gain the least from attending School A.
90. Robert Klitgaard refers to this goal as the social value added approach to
admissions. That is, admissions slots should be allocated in the manner that will generate
the most social value. See KLrrGAARD, supra note 30, at 61-71 (discussing the benefits of
and objections to the social value added approach).
91. See MCPHERSON & SHAPIRO, supra note 43, at 1-3; THRESHER, supra note 43, at
66-76.
92. See, e.g., MCPHERSON & SHAPIRO, supra note 43, at 1-3; THRESHER, supra note
43, at 66-76.
93. See, e.g., BOWEN & BOK, supra note 36, at 118-54; Sanders Korenman &
Christopher Winship, A Reanalysis of the Bell Curve: Intelligence, Schooling and Family




My analysis embodies the macro-productivity principle because
it comports best with the productivity-oriented rationale for
meritocratic admissions.94 Allocating admissions slots on the basis of
micro-productivity might serve the narrow interests of a particular
school, but at the expense of the social productivity that justifies
meritocratic admissions, as a system, in the first place.95
2. Schooling vs. Professional Performance Outcomes
The second normative question concerns the performance
outcomes with respect to which meritocratic admissions should be
evaluated: scholastic performance or professional performance. One
might plausibly view academic excellence as a valued social outcome
in its own right.96 Elite colleges might understandably define merit as
academic excellence, reflecting such universities' understanding of
their mission and role. 97 Alternatively, one might view education as a
means to the end of professional accomplishment.
98
In what follows, I analyze macro-productivity with respect to
professional performance outcomes, in part because I believe that
professional performance better accords with the productive
efficiency rationale, and in part because the available empirical
evidence better suits the analysis of professional performance
outcomes. (I suspect, however, that a focus on scholastic
performance outcomes would fit with the substance of the analysis.)
Focusing on professional performance raises the question of
measurement. There is no transcendent metric, after all, enabling
94. See Daniels, supra note 27, at 212.
95. MCPHERSON & SHAPIRO, supra note 43, at 1-3; THRESHER, supra note 43, at 66-
76. Micro-productivity might deserve deference simply because it represents individual
schools' views of their own interests. But if respect for institutional autonomy is what
supports such an approach to admissions, then given that rationale, schools should be
granted leeway to pursue their own institutional missions in all sorts of ways. The merit
critique of class-based admissions would thus become inapplicable.
96. See, e.g., BOWEN & BOK, supra note 36, at 53-117 (examining grades, class rank,
and graduation rates). Prior grades and test scores are useful admissions tools, in this
view, insofar as they predict academic performance. College grades and test scores, in
turn, are useful insofar as they predict graduate or professional school performance. See
id. at 724-26 (examining class rank and standardized test scores); COLLEGE BOARD,
COMMON SENSE ABOUT SAT SCORE DIFFERENCES AND TEST VALIDITY 3-4 (1997)
(research notes). See generally LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION
COUNCIL, PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF THE LSAT: A NATIONAL SUMMARY OF THE 1990-
1992 CORRELATION STUDIES (1993) (finding that undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores
combined predicted first year grade average in law school).
97. This view conceives of education as an end in itself rather than a means to some
other end. See KLITGAARD, supra note 30, at 116-31.
98. See, e.g., BOWEN & BOK, supra note 36, at 118-54.
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assessment of the contribution of various types and levels of
professional performance to social well-being or societal
productivity.99 Most researchers assess professional outcomes in
dollar terms, as income from wages.1" This approach has an obvious
problem. Various professions might be over- or under-compensated
relative to their social contributions." 1 Nonetheless, wages arguably
represent the best available proxy for social productivity. The fact
that wages may not accurately capture the relative social worth of
different professional outcomes would likely not bias an analysis of
the return to elite versus non-elite college education. The occupation
contribution-compensation discrepancy would bias analysis of the
elite college education pay-off only to the extent that college status
systematically influences the distribution of students among over-
versus under-compensated occupations. Any bias would operate
primarily across occupations, not across institutions.
B. Admissions Policies and Macro-productivity
Which better furthers macro-productivity, the absolute or
relative achievement approach? The inquiry might be framed in two
steps. Recall our two-college society. School A, the more elite and
selective of the two schools, must choose between two well qualified
applicants for the last spot in its entering class. The applicants differ
both in terms of socioeconomic status and achievement. Applicant
One is extremely high-achieving and of high socioeconomic status.
Applicant Two is a bit less high-achieving and of substantially lower
socioeconomic status. Which applicant should School A choose in
order to promote macro-productivity? The absolute achievement
approach dictates Applicant One, the relative achievement approach
dictates Applicant Two.
A further question arises. The choice between the relative and
absolute achievement approaches determines not only who fills that
last spot in the class, but who fills all the other spots in the class.
Who fills those other spots may influence who should fill that last
99. This analysis should not be taken to deny or minimize the importance of the non-
economic benefits of education. For a discussion of the non-economic benefits of
education, see ELCHANAN COHN & TERRY G. GESKE, THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION
34-68 (3d ed. 1990).
100. See, e.g., Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, in THE STRUCTURE
OF SCHOOLING 46, 46-47 (Richard Arum & Irene R. Beattie eds., 2000) (describing the
investment in human capital and the returns to that investment in terms of wages).
101. See KLITGAARD, supra note 30, at 90 (noting the incompleteness and
unreliability of the typical measures of performance contributions).
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spot. The first step of the analysis takes the class composition as a
given. The second step considers the effect of the choice of
admissions criterionon class composition. With respect to either step,
evaluating the macro-productivity consequences of the relative and
absolute achievement approaches is quite complicated-far more
complex than reflexive adherence to the absolute achievement
criterion would suggest.1 2  The inquiry requires resort to the
available empirical evidence. There is, of course, no direct empirical
evidence of which admissions criterion better furthers aggregate
productivity. 0 3 There is empirical data on the individual earnings
outcomes of elite college education.1°4 The link between that
individual level data and aggregate productivity is far from
straightforward, however. To sketch the potential aggregate
productivity consequences of a relative versus absolute achievement
criterion requires the evaluation of alternative theoretical accounts of
the link between elite college education and individual earnings'05
and between individual earnings and aggregate productivity.
1. Empirical Findings
A variety of empirical studies, relying on various data sets, have
established a positive relationship between education and earnings. 06
102. In what follows, I simplify the analysis by not addressing many theoretical or
institutional factors that likely influence actual admissions policies. For example, I do not
consider faculty or alumni interests, or the possible competition among the most elite
schools.
103. See e.g., Henry M. Levin, Educational Performance Standards and the Economy,
EDUC. RES., May 1998, at 4, 4-5 (1998) (noting the difficulty of determining the link, if
any, between national changes in test scores and economic productivity).
104. See infra notes 106-117 and accompanying text.
105. For a useful overview of differing explanations of the education-earnings
relationship, see COHN & GESKE, supra note 99, at 7-8.
106. There is an enormous body of empirical research examining the returns to
education. See generally, e.g., ORLEY ASHENFELTER & CECILIA ROUSE, SCHOOLING,
INTELLIGENCE, AND INCOME IN AMERICA: CRACKS IN THE BELL CURVE (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 6902, 1999) (summarizing empirical evidence of the
relationship between income and education); CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ,
THE RETURNS TO SKILL IN THE UNITED STATES ACROSS THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 7126, 1999) (discussing skill premiums,
dispersion of wage structure, and returns to formal schooling in the twentieth century);
John Cawley et al., Understanding the Role of Cognitive Ability in Accounting for the
Recent Rise in the Economic Return to Education, in MERITOCRACY AND ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY, supra note 15, at 230 (discussing the components of the apparent return to
education); Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, Aptitude or Achievement: Why Do
Test Scores Predict Educational Attainment and Earnings?, in EARNING & LEARNING:
HOW SCHOOLS MATTER 15 (Susan E. Mayer & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1999) (presenting
data on the relationship between schooling and income); Susan E. Mayer, From Learning
1054 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79
Recently, a number of researchers, motivated in part by rising tuition
costs at our nation's most selective universities, have investigated
whether economic returns to college education differ on the basis of
school quality (defined in terms of how elite a school is and the
selectivity of its admissions process). 1°7 Early research found a quite
substantial payoff to college quality.10 8  These studies sought to
measure the contribution to earnings of elite college education by
controlling for a variety of student characteristics. 0 9
More recent studies suggest that prior results overstated the
return to elite college education by insufficiently controlling for
student characteristics that might influence subsequent earnings.110
Specifically, the early studies failed to control for productivity-related
to Earning, in EARNING & LEARNING: How SCHOOLS MATTER, supra, at 3 (describing
the models advanced to account for the correlation between education and income);
Chinhui Juhn et al., Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns to Skill, 101 J. POL. ECON.
410 (1993) (examining educational returns); Richard J. Murnane et al., The Growing
Importance of Cognitive Skills in Wage Determination, 77 REV. ECON. & STAT. 251
(1995) (examining the relationship between education, cognitive skill, and wages).
107. The concept of school quality is, of course, notoriously difficult to define. Most
researchers have defined quality as selectivity in admissions, as reflected in the average
SAT score of the student body. See, e.g., JOSEPH G. ALTONJI & THOMAS A. DUNN, THE
EFFECTS OF SCHOOL AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS ON THE RETURN TO EDUCATION
1 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 5072, 1995); JERE R. BEHRMAN ET AL.,
THE IMPACT OF COLLEGE QUALITY ON WAGES: ARE THERE DIFFERENCES AMONG
DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS? 9-12, 16-18 (Williams Project on the Econ. of Higher Educ.,
Discussion Paper No. 38, 1996); DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, LABOR MARKET
EFFECTS OF SCHOOL QUALITY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 1 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 5450,1996); STACY BERG DALE & ALAN B. KRUEGER, ESTIMATING
THE PAYOFF TO ATTENDING A MORE SELECTIVE COLLEGE: AN APPLICATION OF
SELECTION ON OBSERVABLES AND UNOBSERVABLES 1-3, 17-23 (Nat'l Bureau Econ.
Res., Working Paper 7322, 1999); Eric Eide et al., Does It Pay to Attend an Elite Private
College?: Evidence on the Effects of Undergraduate College Quality on Graduate School
Attendance, 17 ECON. EDUC. REV. 371, 375-75 (1998); Linda Datcher Loury & David
Garman, College Selectivity & Earnings, 13 J. LAB. ECON. 289,291-95 (1995).
108. CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 107, at 11-19 (reviewing early studies relating
college quality to earnings); DOMINIC BREWER & RONALD EHRENBERG, DOES IT PAY
TO ATTEND AN ELITE PRIVATE COLLEGE? EVIDENCE FROM THE SENIOR HIGH CLASS
OF 1980, at 238-71 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 5613, 1996) (reviewing
early studies relating college quality to earnings); Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic
Preferences in College Admissions, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 431, 447
(Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) (finding that attending a college with
a higher average SAT score is associated with increased earnings later in life).
109. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 108, at 433-51 (controlling for parental education,
family income, SAT scores, high school grade point average, and gender in a study of the
economic return to college quality).
110. See, e.g., id. at 447 (finding a substantial college quality payoff, but noting that the
results might overstate the actual return because of the possibility that elite colleges
select applicants on the basis of productivity-related characteristics that are unobservable
to the researcher).
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characteristics apparent to the schools but not to researchers. If the
most elite schools admitted students partly based on such
characteristics, then ostensibly similar groups of students from highly
selective and less selective colleges might, in fact, differ
significantly.' Subsequent research that attempted to control for
previously uncontrolled differences in student characteristics found
substantially diminished, but not non-existent, returns to college
quality."
2
The study that best controls for individual differences
unobservable to researchers constructed a data set of students
admitted to both more and less selective colleges." Some students
chose to attend the more selective school, other students the less
selective one." 4 This study found an inverse relation between student
socioeconomic status and returns to elite college education. Lower
socioeconomic status students reaped greater earnings benefits than
higher socioeconomic status students from attending high status
colleges."
5
The differential return to elite college education does not mean
that low socioeconomic status students professionally outperform
high socioeconomic status students."6 Rather, the differential return
111. This is one example of the fundamental difficulty in the research literature that
examines the causes of the positive relationship between education and earnings. In its
simplest form, the issue is whether increased earnings are actually caused by skills
imparted by education or whether earnings are the result of relatively stable ability, with
which educational achievement is typically correlated. See, e.g., Cawley et al., supra note
106, at 230; Korenman & Winship, supra note 93, at 49.
112. For studies that attempt to control for productivity-related student characteristics
not directly observable by researchers, but on the basis of which schools might admit
applicants, see BEHRMAN ET AL., supra note 107, at 9-12, 16-18; BREWER &
EHRENBERG, supra note 108, passim; Jere R. Behram et al., College Choice and Wages:
Estimates using Data on Female Twins, 78 REv. ECON. & STAT. 672, 672-73 (1996).
113. DALE & KRUEGER, supra note 107, at 2 (explaining that the sample consisted of
students similar in observable characteristics that were both accepted and rejected by a
comparable set of colleges).
114. ld. at 1-3, 17-23.
115. Id. at 23 (concluding that there is "a higher payoff to attending a more selective
college for children from lower income households); id. (noting that "the interaction term
[for socioeconomic status and college quality payoff] is statistically significant and
generally has a sizeable magnitude"). Some other researchers have also found evidence
of an inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and the return to education. See
e.g., ASHENFELTER & ROUSE, supra note 106, at 17-18 (discussing evidence that suggests
that the economic return to additional years of schooling is inversely related to parents'
educational level).
116. See, e.g., BOWEN & BOK, supra note 36, at 136 (finding that high socioeconomic
status students tend to professionally outperform low socioeconomic status students,
holding academic achievement constant).
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reflects the fact that low socioeconomic status students would
perform substantially less well without the elite education than would
higher socioeconomic status students. The low socioeconomic
students gained more from attending the elite school than the high
socioeconomic students would have lost by attending the less elite
school.117 Whether this finding supports the relative achievement
approach depends on the theoretical model that accounts for the
relationship between education and individual earnings, and between
individual earnings and social productivity.
2. Mechanisms Linking Education, Earnings, and Social Productivity
There are three models that singly or in combination might
explain the education-earnings relationship: the human capital
model," the signaling-filtering model,"9 and the social capital-
networking model.12 In the human capital model, education boosts
individual, and hence societal, productivity. The earnings gains from
education represent enhanced individual productivity.
In the signaling-filtering model, by contrast, schools do not
enhance individuals' actual productivity, so much as sort on the basis
of ability, the presumed determinant of market rewards. 121 In this
view, the link between education and earnings largely reflects the
correlation of education and ability." 2 Higher ability students seek
more education, and universities select and differentiate students on
117. Relatedly, there is also evidence that black students experience a greater
economic return to college quality than white students. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 36, at
128.
118. For an overview of the human capital model, including criticisms, see GARY S.
BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL passim (3d ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1993) (1964); Mayer,
supra note 106, at 4-5; Schultz, supra note 100, at 46.
119. Kenneth Arrow and Michael Spence were two earlier proponents of the
signaling-filtering model. See A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING:
INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES passim
(1974) [hereinafter SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING]; Kenneth J. Arrow, Higher Education
as a Filter, 2 J. PuB. ECON. 193, passim (1973); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87
Q.J. ECON. 355, passim (1973). For an overview of the signaling-screening model,
including a discussion of relevant empirical findings, see COHN & GESKE, supra note 99,
at 58-68; Hiroshi Ishida et al., Educational Credentials and Promotion Chances in
Japanese-American Organizations, 62 AM. SOC. REv. 866, 866-68 (1997); Mayer, supra
note 106, at 6.
120. See James Coleman & Thomas Hoffer, Schools, Families, and Communities, in
THE STRUCTURE OF SCHOOLING, supra note 100, at 69, passim (discussing social capital).
121. See, e.g., SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING, supra note 119, at 14; Arrow, supra note
119, at 193-95; Spence, supra note 119, at 358.
122. See, e.g., Arrow, supra note 119, at 193-95.
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the basis of ability.'13 Employers inexpensively rely on the signal
education provides, avoiding the substantial cost and inconvenience
of directly assessing individuals' abilities. 24 Productive efficiency
depends in part on the efficiency or precision of the education
signal.'2 "Messy" signals may diminish productive efficiency;
accurate signals may enhance it.
The social capital-networking model supposes that schools do
change productivity, but not by enhancing cognitive skills.126
Productivity gains result instead from social networking with
classmates and alumni or the transmission of informal cultural
knowledge. Thus, a school benefits its students simply by
assembling a particular group of students.
The socioeconomic status differential in the elite college payoff
empirically supports the relative achievement approach under either
the human capital or social capital-networking model. Under the
signaling-filtering model, in contrast, the empirical finding constitutes
an argument neither for nor against the relative achievement
approach. None of the models supports the absolute achievement
approach.
3. Changes in Student Populations
What of the effects of the admissions criterion on the
composition of the student population? The relative achievement
approach might produce two distinct changes in the student
populations of elite schools. It would lower students' aggregate
socioeconomic status, and because socioeconomic status and
academic achievement are positively related, it would lower students'
aggregate absolute academic achievement. These changes might
diminish the socioeconomic differential in the payoff to elite college
123. Id
124. Id.; see SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING, supra note 119, at 14.
125. See Arrow, supra note 119, at 194, 202-04. Based on Arrow's analysis, higher
education, as a whole, may be inefficient from the standpoint of social productivity. Id. at
199-202. Given the existence of a system of higher education, the implication of Arrow's
analysis is that the more accurate the filter, the better.
126. Id. at 193-94 (discussing the socialization view of education as analogous to the
human capital approach in that both boost individual productivity). Admittedly, a fuller
account of the social capital-networking model would be more complicated than the
version I offer here. For example, the social capital-networking account might be
decomposed into either human capital or signaling components.
127. See generally Pierre Bourdieu, Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction, in
THE STRUCTURE OF SCHOOLING, supra note 100, at 56 (discussing the distribution of
cultural capital through education); Coleman & Hoffer, supra note 120, at 69 (discussing
social capital in the family, school, and community, and its effects on education).
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education (which is significant under the human capital and social
capital-networking models) or they might lessen the efficiency of the
signal (which matters under the signaling-filtering model).28
a. Human Capital
If education augments human capital by enhancing cognitive
skills,129 the lower socioeconomic status profile of a student
population would not undermine the education-earnings
relationship. 30 But a lowered absolute achievement profile might
undermine the education-earnings relationship. Students learn from
their classmates; the lower aggregate level of student achievement
means that one's classmates would constitute less of a resource.
Lower achieving students might stand to benefit more than higher
achieving students,'13 but the larger the proportion of the student
population comprised of lower achieving students, the less valuable
the collective resource represented by the student population. 2
Implementation of a relative achievement approach might also
affect productivity by influencing incentives to acquire human
capital. 33 Incentives are a non-linear function of the likelihood of
obtaining admission.l 4 Incentives are not maximized if receipt of the
128. A number of studies have found that peer group influences affect student
outcomes. See, e.g., Judith K. Ide et al., Peer Group Influence on Educational Outcomes:
A Quantitative Synthesis, 73 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 472, 483 (1981) (concluding, based on meta-
analysis of a variety of studies, that "peer influence is a strong, consistent determinant of
a wide range of educational outcomes for elementary and high school students").
129. See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Does Schooling Raise Earnings by Making
People Smarter, in MERITOCRACY AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, supra note 15, at 118,
118-124; Schultz, supra note 100, at 313.
130. In the following Sections, references to the education-earnings relationship
should be understood to refer to the differential payoff of elite college education by
student socioeconomic status.
131. JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: How SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALITY 7-
8 (1985). For other treatments of tracking, see, e.g., TOM LOvELEss, THE TRACKING
AND ABILITY GROUPING DEBATE passim (Thomas B. Fordham Found., Fordham
Report No. 8, 1998), http:llwww.edexcellence.netllibrary/track.html (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); Susan A. Olsen, Detracking Helps At-Risk Students, EDUC.
WK., June 11, 1997, http://www.edweek.org/ewlew-printstory.cfmn?slug=37olsen.h16 (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review); Debra Viadero, On the Wrong Track?, EDUC.
WK., Sept. 23,1998, at 27, http://www.edweek.orgew/ew-printstory.cfin?slug=O7track.h18
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
132. BECKER, supra note 118, at 7-21; JACOB MINCER, SCHOOLING, EXPERIENCE,
AND EARNINGS 101-02 (1974); Bowles & Gintis, supra note 129, at 118-124; see infra
note 139 (reviewing the conclusion that subsequent performance of higher-achieving
students is not significantly diminished in a heterogeneous groups, but the performance of
initially lower-achieving students is substantially improved in such groups).
133. See, e.g., Sen, supra note 15, at 7-8.
134. For a discussion of the relation of incentives and admissions policies, see Coate &
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reward is either too likely or too unlikely.135 Thus, the incentive
effects of a relative, as opposed to absolute, achievement criterion is
difficult to estimate in the abstract. The incentive effects are
indeterminate for low and high socioeconomic status students alike.
For example, a relative achievement approach might undermine
incentives for some high socioeconomic status students (e.g., the
lower-achieving members of the group) and enhance incentives for
others (e.g., the highest-achieving students). I think it most likely,
however, that the relative achievement approach would, on the
whole, enhance incentives for low socioeconomic status students and
undermine incentives for higher socioeconomic status students. Yet,
it is difficult to estimate the comparative magnitudes of these two
shifts.
b. Signaling-Filtering
In the signaling-filtering model, productive efficiency depends
on the extent to which schools sort on the basis of what employers
value.16  A change in the socioeconomic profile of the student
population would have no effect on the accuracy of the signal, but a
change in the achievement level might. The magnitude of the loss of
accuracy would depend on the composition of the signal. A
decrement in the achievement profile of the student population
might weaken the correspondence between admissions criteria and
what employers value, lessening the efficiency of the sorting process.
Two factors, however, weigh against this conclusion and suggest
that the signal may be less sensitive to changes in the admissions
process. First, even the most selective colleges seek to further a
variety of goals through the admissions process and admit students
on numerous bases other than probable future performance. 137 The
high value of diplomas from such schools suggests that the process
Loury, supra note 39, at 1225 (noting that decisions regarding human capital investment
depend on the value of the reward and the change in probability of receiving the reward
as a result of the investment).
135. See i at 1231.
136. The effect on the absolute achievement level of admitted students, rather than
their socioeconomic status, is relevant here, as most employers likely seek employees with
particular skills and use educational attainment as a proxy for possession of those skills.
The relative achievement approach's lowering of socioeconomic status is probably
irrelevant to this model, except to the extent that an employer's profile of a desired
employee involves traits associated with socioeconomic class rather than cognitive
abilities or technical skills, and the extent to which cognitive ability is a function of class.
137. See, e.g., DEREK BOK, HIGHER LEARNING 4-7 (1986) (describing several values
and functions of the university).
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can tolerate a fair amount of noise before the signal becomes
impaired. Second, the signal results not only from the admissions
decision, but also from the student's academic performance and other
activities during college.138 Employers use grades as a means of
comparing students within any given institution.139 Overall, it is not
clear that there would be any net loss in the strength of the signal
provided by both admissions policies and grading processes 40
c. Social Capital-Networking
Under the social capital-networking model, a change in the
absolute achievement profile of the student population would not
affect the education-earnings relationship. A lowered aggregate
achievement level would have no effect on the education-earnings
relationship because the benefits of a selective university stem largely
from the socioeconomic characteristics of the school's student
population and alumni.
The social capital benefit to an individual student would be
inversely related to the student's socioeconomic status. But the low
status students who stand to benefit most would also diminish the
value of the benefit available for others. Lower socioeconomic status
students would benefit the most individually, but an entire class of
low socioeconomic status students would have the least benefit to
offer.
Although there is empirical evidence tending to support each of
these three models, 4' the human capital model represents the
138. For evidence that college grades are positively related to earnings outcome, see
generally DALE & KRUEGER, supra note 107 (finding that class rank correlates to future
earnings); Loury & Garman, supra note 107 (finding a positive correlation between
college grade point average and later earnings); see also Arrow, supra note 119, at 195
(noting that "colleges serve really as a double filter, once in selecting entrants, and once
in passing or failing students").
139. There is, of course, no direct evidence of the effect of alternative absolute
achievement profiles of a student population on aggregate subsequent achievement. The
same sort of issue, however, has been studied in the context of primary and secondary
schools, in the form of an analysis of the effects of ability tracking. Ability tracking
groups students by achievement level; the alternative, de-tracking or non-tracking,
creates heterogeneous achievement groupings. While not all researchers agree, the
general finding of this literature is that the subsequent performance of higher-achieving
students is not significantly diminished by heterogeneous grouping, while the
performance of initially lower-achieving students is substantially improved. The ground-
breaking work in the field was undertaken by Jeannie Oakes. See OAKES, supra note 131,
passim.
140. Arrow, supra note 119, at 195-98.
141. See Mayer, supra note 106, at 4-12; see also David Jaeger & Marianne Page,
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dominant approach and has attracted the most empirical support.42
The human capital model also best reflects universities'
understandings of the effect of elite college education on students'
subsequent earnings and societal productivity.
Under any of the models, however, there is a reasonably strong
case for some of the relative achievement approach. It is difficult to
say what degree of change in class composition would be necessary to
constitute a persuasive case against the relative achievement
approach. Most importantly, none of the models offers much
justification for rigid adherence to the absolute achievement
criterion.
IV. RACIAL OUTCOMES OF CLASS-BASED ADMISSIONS
In this Part, I first sketch the sort of variables that the relative
achievement approach might incorporate and then explain why that
formulation of socioeconomic status would likely produce a
significant amount of racial diversity among admitted students. I do
not describe the relative achievement approach or its likely outcomes
in great detail. The goal, rather, is to frame the inquiry.
A. Socioeconomic Status as Resource Availability
The justifications for class-based admissions, particularly the
deservingness rationale, suggest that socioeconomic status should be
formulated broadly so as to account for environmental disparities
that might influence early academic achievement. 143 Because the
Degrees Matter: New Evidence on Sheepskin Effects in the Returns to Education, 78 REv.
EDUC. STAT. 733, 738 (1996) (concluding, based on statistical analysis of census data, that
degree receipt influences subsequent earnings-a finding that supports the signaling
theory of the education-earnings relationship). For an earlier study, with a similar
finding, see Thomas Hungerford & Gary Solon, Sheepskin Effects in the Returns to
Education, 69 REv. EDUC. STAT. 175, 175-77 (1987). The currently available studies do
not unequivocally support either of the alternative explanations of the education-earnings
relationship. The methodological challenges of such analyses are immense. One
challenge is to disentangle individual versus institutional contributions to outcomes.
Higher ability students are concentrated at higher status schools, which are perceived to
offer higher quality education. The difficulties of separating out school effects and
individual effects are further complicated by the lack of reliable independently valid
measures of school quality, individual ability, or other performance-related individual
characteristics.
142. See, e.g., BOWEN & BOK, supra note 36, at 55 (discussing diploma/sheepskin
effects); Cawley et al., supra note 106, at 230 (describing the empirical support for the
human capital model); Mayer, supra note 106, at 4-5 (same).
143. The deservingness and productivity rationales might produce different sorts of
admissions policies. Whereas deservingness might weigh in favor of a policy that takes
account of all environmental factors that depressed achievement, the productivity
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category of achievement-related resources encompasses far more
than parental income, the relative achievement approach relies on a
broad rather than narrow conception of socioeconomic status."4
Differential access to achievement-related resources may occur at the
level of a child's family, school, or neighborhood.
The relative achievement formulation of socioeconomic status
would encompass family characteristics such as parental income,
education, occupation, and wealth.145 A variety of studies have
demonstrated positive relationships between early academic
achievement and parental income, education, and occupation.
14 6
Wealth, a relatively recent addition to the lexicon of inequality, has
rationale would warrant consideration of those factors that depress performance only to
the extent that the depressed performance could be remediated by elite college
education. The extent to which depressed performance is remediable by elite college
education may depend on the environmental cause of the diminished performance. In
this analysis I do not consider this distinction, primarily because I would have no basis on
which to apply it intelligently.
144. Cf. Fallon, supra note 15, at 817-18 (noting the argument that merit systems
should compensate for inequality in social distribution of benefits and opportunities);
Malamud, Lessons and Caveats, supra note 9, at 1898-900 (recommending the
development of a complex metric to measure economic status for the purpose of class-
based affirmative action).
145. A number of scholars have focused on wealth as a measure of inequality. See,
e.g., ANDREW HACKER, MONEY: WHO HAS How MUCH AND WHY 145-72 (1997);
Martha E. Gimenez et al., Considerations on Wealth, Class, and Race, 23 CRIT. SOC. 105,
114-16 (1997); S.M. Miller, Ill Fares the Land: The Wealth of a Nation, 29 SOC. POL'Y 47,
51-52 (1999); John C. Weicher, The Rich and the Poor: Demographics of the U.S. Wealth
Distribution, FED. RESERVE BANK ST. Louis REv., July-Aug. 1997, at 25, 25. Richard
Kahlenberg considers these factors as part of his formulation of class. See KAHLENBERG,
supra note 1, at 83-152.
146. June Axinn et al., The Effects of Parents' Income, Wealth, and Attitudes on
Children's Completed Schooling and Self-Esteem, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP
POOR 518,538-39 (Greg J. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1997); Martha S. Hill &
Greg J. Duncan, Parental Family Income and Socioeconomic Attainment of Children, 16
SOC. SCI. RES. 39, 39-66 (1987); Martin E. Orland, Demographics of Disadvantage:
Intensity of Childhood Poverty and its Relation to Educational Achievement, in ACCESS TO
KNOWLEDGE 43, 50-54 (John I. Goodlad & Pamela Keating eds., 1990). Not all
researchers agree that parental income, education, or occupation are the causal influences
on children's achievement. E.g., SUSAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BuY 2-3
(1997) (arguing that parental income is not as important for children's outcome as
commonly thought, and that parental income appears to matter because it correlates with
other characteristics that do matter). Some researchers contend that parental
characteristics and children's achievement correlate because they result from innate
ability or some inborn quality that parents transmit to children. See generally RICHARD J.
HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (claiming that racial group disparities in innate
ability account for observed racial group differences in academic performance).
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not been studied as extensively as the more traditional indicators of
economic status.147
Conceptually, wealth might bear a contradictory relation to early
academic achievement. On one hand, wealth's dependence on inter-
generational transfer might represent the accumulation of
achievement-related resources not otherwise reflected in traditional
indicators of socioeconomic status. On the other hand, wealth might
constitute forgone opportunities to invest in a child's education and
intellectual growth, as parents choose to develop one sort of capital
rather than another. Recent studies suggest, however, that parental
wealth might positively influence children's educational outcomes net
of the effect of parental income, education, or occupation.
148
The same type of characteristics considered at the family level
would also be considered at the school and neighborhood levels. A
variety of empirical studies confirm that neighborhood
socioeconomic characteristics, 49 as well as peer characteristics and
school composition, influence early academic achievement.150 Other
school and community characteristics may be relevant as well.15
147. See Lee A. Lillard, Inequality: Earnings vs. Human Wealth, 67 AM. ECON. REV.
42,42-52 (1977) (noting that income inequality has been an issue of continuing interest to
economists, while researchers have begun to examine wealth inequality more recently).
148. See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH,
AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 57-65 (1999) (describing the variety of ways in which
wealth might influence educational outcomes, net of the effect of parental income,
education, or occupation).
149. See, e.g., Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al., Do Neighborhoods Influence Child and
Adolescent Development?, 99 AM. J. SoC. 353, 374-77 (1993) (finding that after adjusting
for family economic status, children's IQ and other attributes are affected by
neighborhood characteristics, particularly affluent neighbors); Mary Corcoran et al.,
Association Between Men's Economic Status and Their Family and Community Origins, 27
J. HUM. RESOURCES 575, 575-77 (1992) (finding that men's economic outcomes are
influenced by family and community variables); Linda Datcher, Effects of Community and
Family Background on Achievement, 64 REv. ED. STAT. 32, 32 (1982) (finding that
achievement is positively related to family background and community resources);
Sanford Dornbusch, Community Influences on the Relation of Family Statuses to
Adolescent School Performance: Differences Between African-Americans and Non-
Hispanic Whites, 99 AM. J. EDUC. 543, 543 (1991) (finding that community socioeconomic
status was the only factor related to grade point average for both blacks and whites in a
study of high school students); Catherine L. Garner & Stephen W. Raudenbush,
Neighborhood Effects on Educational Attainment: A Multilevel Analysis, 64 SOC. EDUC.
251,260 (1996) (stating that neighborhoods shape achievement, even when controlling for
individual and family variables).
150. See, e.g., Stephen J. Caldas & Carl Bankston III, Effect of School Population
Socioeconomic Status on Individual Academic Achievement, 90 J. EDUC. RES. 269,274-75
(1997) (finding that peer family social status has a substantive effect on academic
achievement); Nancy A. Gonzales et al., Family, Peer, and Neighborhood Influences On
Academic Achievement Among African-American Adolescents: One-Year Prospective
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This brief discussion of components of the relative achievement
approach highlights a conceptual as well as practical difficulty. The
goal of accounting for achievement-related resource disparities
warrants consideration of variables far beyond the typical
components of socioeconomic status. But how far should this
consideration extend? Indeed, a dazzling array of variables might
conceivably be incorporated.15 What of the neglected child of
affluent, well educated parents? Or the child caught in his divorced
parents' tug-of-war? Should such circumstances, which do likely
influence early academic achievement, enter the relative achievement
calculus?
Where and how to draw the line is a difficult question. The
conceptual problem reintroduces the social determinism conundrum
from Part II. If enough environmental factors are considered then, at
the extreme, each applicant will belong to a category of one.
Individual differences will fade into the melange of environmental
influences.
I think at least two practical considerations are relevant to that
determination. First is the issue of measurability. Objective
variables are preferable to subjective variables. Second is the issue of
manipulability. Some factors are more prone to applicant
manipulation or misrepresentation than others. 53 For example, an
applicant might more readily claim (falsely) that his parents
Effects, 24 AM. J. COMM. PSYCH. 365,366 (1996) (suggesting that peer and neighborhood
context are more powerful determinants of school performance for African-American
adolescents than the immediate family); Esther Ho Sui-Cho & J. Douglas Willms, Effects
of Parental Involvement on Eighth-Grade Achievement, 69 Soc. EDUC. 126, 138 (1996)
(concluding that findings from a study of middle school students "suggest the SES of a
school had an effect on achievement that was comparable to the effects associated with
the SES of a family").
151. For example the prevalence of receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, the percentage of single parent families, and the percentage of residents who
own their own homes may contribute to a fuller measure of resource availability.
152. The effect of various environmental factors on academic achievement is the
subject of substantial scholarly inquiry. See, e.g., Duane F. Alwin, Family Size and
Achievement, SCIENCE, July 1998, at 199, 199-200 (linking low achievement to family
size, which is in turn related to socioeconomic disadvantage); Carol S. Cash et al.,
Environment Tied to Successful Learning, 36 SCH. PLAN. & MGMT. 12, 12-13 (1997)
(linking poor academic achievement to substandard school building condition).
153. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Weiss, Making an Art of the Sob Story, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16,
1999, at Al (discussing the personal tragedies recounted in application essays for
University of California campuses as applicants attempt to gain points for having
surmounted obstacles); see also Tom Hayden & Connie Rice, California Cracks its
Mortarboards, NATION, Sept. 18, 1995, at 264, 265 (opining that the focus on
disadvantage will cause applicants to "parade ... 'dysfunctions' in an effort to be
considered for campuses they are fully qualified to attend").
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neglected him than (also falsely) that his school did not offer
advanced placement courses or that his parents worked blue-collar
jobs. These two practical concerns-measurability and
manipulability-should guide selection of variables, but there will be
many variables with respect to which there is no single sensible
resolution.
Whatever the variables embodied in the relative achievement
approach, socioeconomic considerations should apply to the entire
applicant pool. The rationale for the relative achievement approach
is that environmental factors may influence the early academic
achievement of the entire range of applicants, not simply those below
some socioeconomic threshold.
B. Racial Diversity and Class-Based Admissions
A number of scholars have characterized class-based admissions
policies as incapable of producing substantial racial diversity among
admitted students.54 The common form of the racial diversity
critique is that class-based approaches produce minimal racial
diversity because even though black applicants, for example, are
more likely than white applicants to be low-income, there are many
more low-income white applicants than black applicants. 55
Moreover, because academic achievement differs by race even
among low-income students, a disproportionately small percentage of
high-achieving low-income students are black. Thus, one analyst
concludes, under a class-based admissions policy, for each low-
154. Gary Orfield, Campus Resegregation and its Alternatives, in CHILLING
ADMISSIONS, supra note 9, at 7-16 (emphasizing that class-based policies cannot
substitute for race-based affirmative action); Malamud, Assessing Class-Based
Affirmative Action, supra note 9, at 465 (cautioning that whites will be the likely
beneficiaries of class-based affirmative action).
155. Orfield, supra note 154, at 9 (observing that "[m]ost poor people in the United
States are neither black nor Latino" and explaining that "a ranking of students below the
poverty line by their test scores would result in a pool of favored applicants that was
mostly Asian and white"); Wightman, supra note 9, at 39-45 (concluding empirically that
socioeconomic status is an inadequate surrogate for race because it creates problems of
academic preparedness and perceived fairness among minority applicants). Malamud,
Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 9, at 465 (observing that "[m]ost of
the poverty-based affirmative action slots will go to whites, by simple force of numbers").
156. Thomas J. Kane, Misconceptions in the Debate over Affirmative Action in College
Admissions, in CHILLING ADMISSIONS, supra note 9, at 17, 24-26; Karabel, supra note 9,
at 37-38; see also Michael T. Nettles et al., Race and Testing in College Admissions, in
CHILLING ADMISSIONS, supra note 9, at 97, 105 (observing that "a smaller percentage of
African Americans and Hispanics fall into the high end of the [standardized test] score
distribution than of whites and Asians").
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income black student admitted, a school would need to admit as
many as six low-income white students.57
This argument sensibly rebuts the simplistic view that because
blacks, for example, are disproportionately low-income, an income-
based admissions policy would disproportionately benefit blacks,
perhaps to the point of substituting for race-based affirmative action.
As Jerome Karabel astutely observes: "[R]acial and ethnic
differences remain large, even controlling for income. Indeed, a
careful look at the SAT data reveals that racial differences are
actually larger among the low-income students who would be the
primary targets of a policy emphasizing class.""15  Karabel then
describes the drastic declines in racial diversity among entering law
and medical school classes at the University of California campuses
after the prohibition of affirmative action.
159
This critique, however, overlooks the significance of both the
formulation and the application of the socioeconomic status factor.
While narrow formulations of socioeconomic status (e.g., income)
that are narrowly applied (i.e., to only a small subset of students
below some income threshold) will admittedly produce minimal
racial diversity, the relative achievement approach's broad measure
of socioeconomic status applied to the entire applicant pool would
produce substantial racial diversity.
The broad measure of socioeconomic status would significantly
alter the relative rankings of students from different racial groups
because it would more fully capture the resource disparities
associated with race than would an income-based conception of
socioeconomic status. The group of high-scoring, low socioeconomic
status students is overwhelmingly white, but only when
socioeconomic status is defined in terms of income-a common
measure of socioeconomic status,16° but an inadequately narrow one
157. Kane, supra note 156, at 24-25.
158. Karabel, supra note 9, at 37-38.
159. Id. at 40-45; see also Deborah C. Malamud, A Response to Professor Sander, 47 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 504, 504 (1997) (pointing out the drastic decrease in black enrollment at
UCLA after it replaced race-based affirmative action with a class-based program).
Karabel charts the decline in racial diversity without considering the potential effect of
class-based admissions or the fact that after the prohibition of affirmative action, the
University of California campuses became extremely unattractive to prospective
applicants compared to other schools that continued to rely on race-based affirmative
action. Thus, the racial diversity effect of ending affirmative in the University of
California system, while maintaining it in private schools as well as in many public
universities in other states, probably overstates the loss of diversity if affirmative action
were prohibited nationwide.
160. See, e.g., Sammis B. White et al., Socioeconomic Status and Achievement
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if the goal is to account for resource disparities that influence early
achievement.
The components of a broader measure of socioeconomic status
that would most increase racial diversity are family wealth
161 and the
socioeconomic characteristics of one's neighborhood and school'
62-
both of which differ dramatically by race, even when traditional
measures of socioeconomic status such as family income and parental
education are held constant. 63 Both factors do far more than simply
compound the inequality manifested by family income or parental
education.)64  Rather, analyses of both wealth-holding and
Revisited, 28 URB. EDUC. 328, 330-31 (1993) (listing definitions of "socioeconomic
status" used in several earlier studies with family income as a common factor); White,
supra note 88, at 461 (measuring socioeconomic status as a function of income, education,
and occupation).
161. Racial differences in wealth are phenomenal, even controlling for other
components of socioeconomic status. See CONLEY, supra note 148, passim; MELVIN L.
OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY passim (1995). Racial wealth differences aside, a
number of scholars have recently began to focus on wealth as a measure of inequality.
See HACKER, supra note 145, at 145-72; Gimenez et al., supra note 145, at 114-16; Miller.,
supra note 145, at 47-49; Weicher, supra note 145, at 25.
162. Wealth and neighborhood characteristics would likely be correlated, but they are
conceptually distinct. For example, part of the significance of racial segregation is that
even blacks and whites of nearly comparable wealth holdings are likely to live in very
different types of neighborhoods.
163. See CONLEY, supra note 148, at 1. Based on my review of the literature, the
UCLA law school admissions program best analyzes the effect of both wealth and
neighborhood characteristics on the racial composition of the rank order of applicants.
The UCLA program takes account of neighborhood socioeconomic status through the use
of census tract data, which is widely available and which represents a small enough unit of
analysis to meaningfully capture neighborhood differences. Sander, supra note 3, at 482.
As the experience under the UCLA admissions model indicates, the inclusion of
neighborhood socioeconomic status variables alters the racial composition of the rank
order of applicants. Id. at 473. Specifically, more racial minorities would likely be
admitted with the consideration of neighborhood characteristics than without such
consideration. UCLA's innovative and admirable admissions program comes closest to
examining the racial effect of consideration of applicants' family wealth. Id. That is, the
program designers chose a method of statistical representation that largely nullified
differences in wealth. See id. at 486.
164. See Meredith Phillips et al., Family Background, Parenting Practices, and the
Black-White Test Score Gap, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, supra note 108, at
103, 130-31 (observing that "large racial differences in neighborhood poverty do suggest
that traditional measures of socioeconomic status understate the difference between black
and white children's environments"). Wealth certainly does exacerbate inequality as
reflected in comparisons of family income and education levels. Wealth varies by income
and educational level in the expected fashion for both whites and blacks. Those with
higher incomes and more education typically also possess more wealth. See OLIVER &
SHAPIRO, supra note 161, at 73-75 (exploring the general connection between wealth and
income). Whites are more likely than blacks to have high income and educational levels.
Thus, wealth reinforces the inequality manifested by racial disparities in income and
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neighborhood (and school) characteristics reveal a qualitatively
different pattern of racial inequality.
Controlling for income, education, and even family background,
wealth is in large measure a function of race.165 Differential wealth-
holding by race is not an artifact of the differing demographic profiles
of blacks and whites. For example, middle class blacks hold
dramatically less wealth than whites with comparable education and
income.166  Low socioeconomic status whites, as measured by
education and income, have a wealth-holding comparable to many
middle class blacks. 67 Racial differences in wealth-holding even
among ostensibly comparable socioeconomic groups are astoundingly
large. The magnitude of the change in racial diversity produced by
consideration of wealth could be substantial. Research has begun to
demonstrate that racial differences in important educational
outcomes such as high school graduation and college completion
partially disappear when the analysis controls for wealth in addition
to other socioeconomic factors.
168
As with wealth-holding, an examination of neighborhood and
school characteristics reveals a distinct pattern of racial inequality
that would be obscured by comparisons of family income and
parental education alone.169 As a consequence of racial segregation,
education. Id. at 110-11 (comparing the effect of education on the wealth of blacks and
whites).
165. See, e.g., Racial Wealth Gap Revealed, OAKLAND POST (Cal.), Dec. 15, 1999, at 1,
http:llwww.softlineweb.comlsoftlineweb/ethnic.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (describing a study detailing racial disparities in wealth holding).
166. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 161, at 110. Black families hold less than one-
half the wealth of whites in similar income brackets. Id. Even at comparable education
levels, black individuals possess less wealth than white individuals. Id. For example,
blacks who have earned a baccalaureate degree possess only twenty-three cents of wealth
for every dollar owned by similarly educated white individuals. Id.
167. See id. at 100 (stating that the black middle class owns fifteen cents for every
dollar owned by the white middle class, placing the wealth of the blacks at this
socioeconomic level closer to that of whites at lower levels); see also CHUCK COLLINS ET
AL., SHIFrING FORTUNES: THE PERILS OF THE GROWING AMERICAN WEALTH GAP 55
(1999) (finding in 1995 that the typical wealth of white households was $18,000, black
households $200, and Hispanic households $0).
168. CONLEY, supra note 148, at 68-79 (explaining that commonly observed racial
differences in educational outcomes stem largely from socioeconomic factors rather than
from race per se); Phillips et al., supra note 164, at 138 (concluding that although
traditional measures of socioeconomic status explain only one-third of the test score gap
between black and white children, a broader index of family environment explains two-
thirds of that gap).
169. If neighborhood socioeconomic status merely reflected a family's income and
education, then neighborhood influences would compound disadvantage but would
generate no distinct pattern of disadvantage. Poorly educated, low-income families, white
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blacks and whites of comparable family characteristics neither live in
comparable neighborhoods,'7 0  nor attend similar schools.
71
Notwithstanding the demise of de jure racial segregation in
education 172 and the enactment of federal laws that proscribe a wide
range of racially discriminatory housing practices,'73 both educational
segregation'7 4 and residential segregation 5 are widespread. Racial
segregation produces a segregation of achievement-related resources
on the basis of race, even controlling for family income and
education.176  Racial segregation disadvantages blacks relative to
whites at every level of income and education. 7
The racially redistributive effect of the relative achievement
approach would be further enhanced by the application of the
socioeconomic status factor to the entire applicant pool. Considering
the socioeconomic status of only a small subset of applicants judged
or black, would be cumulatively disadvantaged by their resource-poor community. Well
educated, affluent families, white or black, would be cumulatively advantaged by their
resource-rich community. A measure of neighborhood socioeconomic status would
primarily reveal differences in the magnitude of inequality among income- and education-
defined socioeconomic classes and among races, but it would not reveal a distinctly racial
pattern of inequality.
170. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 151-53 (1993) (describing
inequalities between black and white neighborhoods regardless of affluence); OLIVER &
SHAPIRO, supra note 161, at 152 (stating that in comparison to affluent whites, affluent
blacks are much more likely to live in neighborhoods where the percentage of births to
unwed mothers are higher, median house values are lower, and the percentage of students
scoring below the fifteenth percentile on achievement tests in local high schools are
higher).
171. See generally CHILLING ADMISSIONS, supra note 9 (discussing issues involving
race and education).
172. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954) (declaring de jure segregation
unconstitutional).
173. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(prohibiting discrimination in a sale or lease of residential property).
174. See generally CHILLING ADMISSIONS, supra note 9 (examining how different
factors affect race and education).
175. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 170, at 78-79 (describing the
persistence of black residential segregation); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 161, at 91
(stating that residential segregation may be attributed to de facto segregation stemming
from the reluctance of blacks to integrate themselves into predominantly white
communities because of fear of violent racial crimes or harassment).
176. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 170, at 152; Richard Thompson Ford,
The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1843,
1850-53 (1994).
177. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 170, at viii (noting that "racial residential
segregation is the principle structural feature of American society responsible for the
perpetuation of urban poverty and represents a primary cause of racial inequality").
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to be "disadvantaged"' 17 necessarily limits the effect of a class-based
admissions policy. The grades and test scores of only a small number
of students would be adjusted. In contrast, applying socioeconomic
considerations to the entire applicant pool might readjust the grades
and test scores of every applicant, except those at the very upper end
of the socioeconomic distribution.
CONCLUSION
This Article has challenged and countered the prevailing
assumption that class-based admissions policies both undermine
meritocratic values and necessarily fail to produce racially diverse
outcomes. 179 The relative achievement approach is as consistent with
the meritocratic principles of individual desert and productive
efficiency as is the prevailing absolute achievement standard. A
sophisticated measure of socioeconomic status that is applied to an
entire applicant pool may yield substantially more racial diversity
than typically thought.
The implications of the argument extend beyond the admissions
debate. Although race-blind, the relative achievement approach
furthers racial equality goals. And it does so in a manner that
exposes the pervasive race-linked inequalities concealed by facile
comparisons of blacks and whites of comparable income and
education levels. Inequalities on the basis of race are expressed
through disparities in resources.'i 0  The relative achievement
approach helps to reveal the extent and expression of racial
inequality, if not the full range of its mechanisms.1
Debate about class-based admissions policies has arisen partly in
response to the prohibition of race-based affirmative action."s My
178. See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, supra note 1, at 123-24 (favoring a class-based
preference in school admissions for "economically disadvantaged" applicants).
179. For an analysis that similarly challenges widespread and uncritically accepted
assumptions, albeit in a different context, see R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire:
Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107
YALE L.J. 875, 896-913 (1998).
180. CONLEY, supra note 148, at 68-79.
181. Analysis of the socioeconomic dimensions of racial inequality does not, of course,
explain the origins of racial inequality. It provides no account of how race and
socioeconomic inequality melded initially. There are a number of outstanding analyses of
this issue. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 170, passim; DAVID R. ROEDIGER,
THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING
CLASS passim (1991).
182. See Kane, supra note 156, at 24 (noting that class based policies have arisen as the
support for or permissibility of race-based affirmative action has declined); Orfield, supra
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support of class-based policies is not conditional on the continued
prohibition of race-based policies.1 3  The relative achievement
approach would be desirable, for the reasons put forth in this Article,
irrespective of the permissibility of race-based affirmative action.
Yet the relative achievement approach bears a contradictory
relationship to race-based affirmative action. Formally, the
implementation of the relative achievement approach would neither
preclude nor compel race-based affirmative action. Yet the relative
achievement approach would make race-based affirmative action less
necessary by partly realizing the goal of racial inclusion.',
Paradoxically, the relative achievement approach also underscores
the need for race-based affirmative action by dramatizing the extent
and depth of racial inequality.a85 The potential racial outcomes of the
relative achievement approach rebut the common criticism of race-
based affirmative action as primarily aiding advantaged racial
minorities. Black affirmative action beneficiaries, although perhaps
relatively advantaged compared to other blacks, are likely not to be
as socioeconomically advantaged as superficial indicators of
socioeconomic status would indicate. In sum, the relative
achievement approach builds the case for efforts to include
disadvantaged racial minorities, even as it renders race-specific
policies less essential to the furtherance of that goal. It both suggests
the efficacy of class-based policies and affirms the need for attention
to racial inequality.
note 154, at 4-9 (noting same); Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1039, 1041-44 (1998) (considering the implications of eliminating race altogether
as a preference in admission decisions).
183. Race-based admissions policies have been judicially invalidated in Texas and
Michigan. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934-35 (5th Cir. 1996); Gratz v. Bollinger, No.
97-CV-75231-DT, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4457, at *34-35 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2001);
Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 97-CV-75928-DT, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3256, at *151-53 (E.D
Mich. Mar. 27, 2001), stay granted, 2001 FED App. 0103P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5606
(6th Cir. Apr. 5, 2001). Race-based affirmative action has been discontinued by ballot
initiative in California, Washington, and Florida. See Sullivan, supra note 182, at 1041
(noting the approval of Proposition 209, which banned racial preferences in education and
other public programs in California); Thomas J. Bray, Initiative 200 Headed for
Michigan?, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 18, 1998, at Bl, http://detnews.comlEDITPAGE/
9811/15fbray/bray.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (discussing the
ballot initiative banning affirmative action in Washington).
184. The relative achievement approach, by potentially increasing the number of a
school's racial minority students, may indirectly diminish the persuasiveness or urgency of
calls for affirmative action. The less dire the racial consequences of not having race-
based affirmative action, the less compelling the need for such a program may seem.
185. See supra Part IV.
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